By Joe deCourcy
© 2003 WorldNetDaily.com

There has been surprise in some quarters that the U.S.-led attack on Iraq has not produced a major terrorist response.

The lack of a major terrorist response to the U.S.-led attack on Iraq in fact mirrors the experience of 1991, and the following points are germane:

1. Islamist-inspired terrorism is fuelled by grievances that long pre-date the U.S.-led attack on Iraq and that will long survive the restoration of Iraqi rule in Baghdad. The perpetration of major acts of anti-Western terrorism, therefore, is dependent on the capacity of the terrorists to act rather than the immediate result of any specific policy (such as the invasion of Iraq).

2. The downward trend in international terrorism since 9-11 indicates that the capacity of al-Qaida to strike against Western targets has been significantly diminished – and common-sense suggests this must be so for the following reasons:

• The group's bases in Afghanistan have been destroyed and significant leaders have been killed or captured.

• International intelligence agencies have been collaborating in a far more systematic way since 9-11. The positive effect that this can have was demonstrated at the time of the last Gulf War in 1991 when very few attacks on Western targets were successful. What attacks there were tended to be minor and on the periphery. That has been the case this time as well.

• One major consequence of the Iraq war is that it has demonstrated to anyone who doubted that the current United States administration is not to be fooled with. This has had a salutary effect on all would-be state-sponsors of terrorism, and a severely degraded al-Qaida is now operating in a much less accommodating environment than was previously the case. No state wants to be found with an al-Qaida smoking gun in its hand.

• Saudi Arabia, in particular, will have been frightened by the tone of last year's Rand Corporation report that stigmatized it as the "kernel of evil." The fact that the author of the report was subsequently released by Rand would not have diminished the impact of the report in Riyadh.

• Likewise in Pakistan, President Musharraf is under no illusions as to what would happen if he were to go soft on al-Qaida. It is true that he is maintaining (even increasing) his support for Kashmiri militancy, but worrying though this is it remains a local issue.

3. Although the capacity of al-Qaida has been greatly reduced for the reasons given above, it could still strike at the periphery without too much trouble. But there are problems with this. The Bali bombing (committed by an affiliate organization) achieved little for the cause while producing widespread revulsion among Indonesia's moderate Muslims.

The huge success of the 9-11 attacks adds to the problem for al-Qaida. It would take something extraordinarily spectacular to top the impact of 9-11, whereas a thwarted attack or one that lacked the emotional significance of 9-11 would be seen as a failure.

The danger posed by non-state terrorism has always been the limitation of deterrence. States can be deterred, but groups of fanatics cannot be. However, they can be harried and hounded and spied upon – and their bases can be destroyed. Furthermore, mounting a major terrorist outrage is more difficult than it might at first sight be thought, and without the tacit support of rogue states, al-Qaida's task has become more difficult still.

This is not, for a moment, to say that there is no danger, but it explains the current quiescence and why less has been heard from al-Qaida in the present circumstances than some thought likely.

It goes almost without saying that there remain great dangers ahead, and the negatives include:

• The Islamic world has an inexhaustible supply of grievances and therefore of potential recruits to the terrorist cause.

• There are still many places where terrorist cells and networks can flourish – from the teeming cities of Indonesia, Pakistan, and even Europe to the remote places of South-East Asia, Central Asia, and the Horn of Africa. The expatriate Arab communities as far afield as South America (in the tri-border area for instance and in Venezuela's Margarita island) provide funds and places of refuge.

• Fanatics can now acquire the means to kill on an unprecedented scale.

The key to future security will be continuing international cooperation and relentless pressure on any states showing signs of renewed support for al-Qaida or similar groups. All the indications are that the Bush administration will continue to insist on the former and will not shy away from the latter (except possibly – and dangerously – in Pakistan). However, there is no such thing as an impregnable defense.